The radical Islamic militants of Central Asia. OSW Report, November 2013 by Lang, Jozef
The radical islamic miliTanTs
of cenTral asia
Józef Lang
The radical islamic miliTanTs  
of cenTral asia
WARSAW
NOVEMBER 2013
Józef Lang
© Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich
im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies
CONtENt EditORS
Olaf Osica, Adam Eberhardt, Krzysztof Strachota
EditOR
Anna Łabuszewska
CO-OpERAtiON
Katarzyna Kazimierska
 
tRANSLAtiON
Józef Lang
CO-OpERAtiON
Jim todd
GRAphiC dESiGN 
pARA-BuCh
phOtOGRAph ON COVER
iMu propaganda materials
dtp
GroupMedia
MApS
Wojciech Mańkowski
puBLiShER
ośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. marka Karpia 
Centre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, poland
phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00
Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40
osw.waw.pl
iSBN 978-83-62936-35-9
Contents
KEy pOiNtS    /5
iNtROduCtiON   /7
I. hiStORiCAL OVERViEW OF RAdiCAL iSLAMiC MiLitANCy  
iN CENtRAL ASiA  /8
1. the beginnings of radical militancy in the region /8
2. the failure of radical islamic militancy /10
3. Occurrences of islamic radicalism in Central Asia after 2001 /12
4. Radical islamic militants from Central Asia in pakistan /14
II. CuRRENt pROFiLE OF thE RAdiCAL iSLAMiC MiLitANtS  
FROM CENtRAL ASiA  /17
1. Strength and ethnic composition /17
2. Leaders /18
3. Manifesto /18
4. Vectors of activity /19
5. Acquisition of funds  /20
6. Cooperation with other terrorist organisations /21
III. ChARACtERiStiCS OF thE ACtiVity OF iSLAMiC RAdiCALS 
FROM CENtRAL ASiA /23
1. Combat versatility /23
2. Structural amorphism and operational mobility /25
3. the universalisation and globalisation of islamic terrorism  /27
IV. AREAS OF OpERAtiON OF thE RAdiCAL iSLAMiC MiLitANtS 
FROM CENtRAL ASiA  /30
1. Afghanistan /30
2. the regional consequences of iMu’s activity in Afghanistan  /32
3. Central Asia and Russia /34
4. Europe and global activities /38
V. pERSpECtiVES /42
MApS    /47
Glossary of abbreviations
IRPT  – Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan
TIP  – Turkestan Islamic Party
IMU  – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
ISAF  – International Security Assistance Force 
ISI  – Inter-Services Intelligence 
IJU  – Islamic Jihad Union 
CSTO  – Collective Security Treaty Organisation
SCO  – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
TTP  – Tehrik-e Taliban-e Pakistan – Taliban Movement of Pakistan 
UTO  – United Tajik Opposition
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Key points
•	 Radical Islamic militants from Central Asia have ceased to be a local phe-
nomenon. The organisations created by those groups (such as the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union) are now affiliated 
not only with Central Asian Islamists, but also those from other countries, 
such as Russia, Pakistan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, 
Turkey and even Myanmar. 
•	 The activities of radical Islamic militants from Central Asia are being con-
ducted on a global scale. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Is-
lamic Jihad Union, which are currently based in Pakistan’s Northern Wa-
ziristan, engage in propaganda, recruitment, fundraising and terrorist 
operations in states distant from their traditional area of interest, such as 
European Union countries, South Asia and the United States. The IMU and 
IJU have shown an ability to disperse geographically and quickly set up op-
erations on new territory. 
•	 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Islamic Jihad Union have ac-
quired high combat versatility. These organisations are capable of utilising 
a wide spectrum of methods ranging from terrorist activity, through guer-
rilla warfare, to regular combat operations. 
•	 As a result of the universalisation of Islamic terrorism, these organisations 
have been intensifying contacts with other international Islamic terror-
ist organisations based in Waziristan (mainly al-Qaida, Taliban and the 
Haqqani Network). A specific system of mutual cooperation has developed 
between them, involving the specialisation of various terrorist organisa-
tions in particular aspects of terrorist activity. The IMU and IJU specialise 
in the recruitment and training of Islamic radicals from around the world, 
becoming a kind of ‘jihad academy’. 
•	 The IMU and IJU’s operations in Afghanistan threaten the further destabi-
lisation of the country. These organisations have de facto become an Uzbek 
wing of the Taliban, engaging in recruitment and combat activities in hith-
erto tranquil northern parts of the country. This is noteworthy in the light 
of the withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan planned for 2014. 
•	 Due to a combination of a wide array of internal problems in the Central 
Asian states (the growing Islamisation of their societies, social frustration, 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
6
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
11
/2
01
3
tensions in the elites, unresolved issues of the succession of power), as well 
as the weakness and inefficiency of state structures, it is possible that the 
IMU and IJU will exploit the internal crises and tensions to accomplish 
their goals. This can be seen in these organisations’ efforts to engage in 
local Islamic terrorism in Kazakhstan after 2011. The IMU’s and IJU’s de-
structive potential for the region is heightened by their presence in north-
ern Afghanistan, as well as the expected drop in stability in Central Asia 
after the withdrawal of the ISAF forces in 2014 and the intensification of 
internal problems in the countries of the region. 
•	 Even a threat that the IMU and IJU might return to Central Asia has far-
reaching political consequences, since it fits into the fears of the elites of the 
region’s countries regarding the stability of the region after 2014 and the 
security vacuum that will occur then. On an internal level it contributes to 
the state tightening its control over society and the fight against growing 
Islamisation, as well as both the real and perceived occurrences of Islamic 
radicalism. On a wider geopolitical scale, this threat is being currently ex-
ploited by Russia to secure its interests, as well as by China to strengthen 
its presence in the region in the security dimension. In the long-term per-
spective, it could contribute to the growth of tensions inside the region, the 
militarisation of Central Asia and an intensification of the rivalry between 
the major powers. 
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introduction
Radical Islamic militants from Central Asia have undergone a long evolution, 
from groups operating on a local scale in the region during the 1990s to in-
ternational terrorist organisations conducting operations on a global scale in 
cooperation with other Islamic terrorist groups. Their current activities and 
forms are multidimensional and complicated, characterised by combat versa-
tility, structural amorphism, operational mobility and operations in different 
fields and theatres simultaneously. It is necessary to examine the evolution of 
these organisations to understand these phenomena. 
In Central Asia there are several radical Islamic groups and milieus, such as 
the Salafists, Jamiat-e Tabliq and Hizb ut-Tahrir. However, due to their largely 
peaceful character (i.e. not undertaking armed struggle) or marginal impor-
tance, they are not the subject of the this report, which is focused on the ac-
tivities of the organised radical Islamic militants from Central Asia, currently 
grouped around two international terrorist organisations – the Islamic Move-
ment of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union.
The report is based on previous studies and research, official documents and 
government statements, media sources and information originating from the 
organisations themselves. These include the organisations’ statements, propa-
ganda materials and declarations by members and leaders of the IMU and IJU 
found on jihadi internet forums. Due to their character, these materials often 
do not have a permanent address, and are circulated online, mostly on jihadi 
forums, some of which require prior registration. 
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i. Historical overview of radical islamic 
militancy in central asia 
The activity of radical Islamic militants from Central Asia can be divided into 
two stages: the first, which includes the beginnings of Islamic radicalism and 
the efforts of radicals to exploit the weakness of the region’s states in the first 
decade after the fall of the USSR; and the second, which includes the period 
after the 9/11 attacks and the fall of the Taliban in 2001, when radicals from 
Central Asia were forced to escape and found themselves in a new environ-
ment, while their influence on the situation in Central Asia was diminished. 
1. the beginnings of radical militancy in the region
The beginnings of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia (and the Soviet Union 
as a whole) go back to the 1980s, when on one hand the crisis of communism 
and Soviet society was perceivable, and on the other, due to perestroyka and 
glasnost, as well as the war in Afghanistan (in which soldiers from the Cen-
tral Asian republics participated), an atmosphere of laxity and an openness 
to new ideas developed. With these changes, religious life started to emerge 
from the underground, and in the Fergana Valley and Tajikistan the first il-
legal radical organisations started to form. Their underground activities 
were aimed at propagating a kind of Islam new to the region and increasing 
the role of religion in the functioning of society. Postulating a revival of the 
religious life, these organisations de facto went against both the traditional 
‘folk’ Islam, and the official Muslim structures which were fully controlled 
by the Soviet authorities. They were inspired by the fundamentalist trends 
which developed in Pakistan (the Deobandi movement), and to a lesser ex-
tent by the Arab jihadists in war-torn Afghanistan and the Iranian funda-
mentalists. This search was a part of a broader and increasingly tempestu-
ous discussion amongst the other Soviet Muslims (Tatars, Muslims from the 
Caucasus), which resulted in the creation of a state-wide Islamic Renaissance 
Party and its local branches. The radicals’ ambitions evolved from small self-
study groups, through demands for the re-Islamisation of society, to calls to 
transform the region – with Muslim identity and sharia as the main points of 
reference and basis for legislations. 
In the early 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet Union, the breakdown of the socio-
political system in the region, the decline of the state and economic collapse, 
the role of radical Islam increased, as did the radicals’ freedom of action. On 
the eve of the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997), Islamists became one of the 
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forces of the emerging opposition, and in Uzbekistan’s Fergana Valley, radical 
organisations began establishing local councils and volunteer militias. 
During this time, the biggest role was played by the radicals in Tajikistan, 
where after achieving independence, a deep political, social and economic cri-
sis, as well as disruption of the balance between rival clans (informal struc-
tures of local elites) led to a civil war1. Despite often being depicted as an ideo-
logical conflict – with the post-communist government on one side, and the 
United Tajik Opposition (UTO), comprised of democratic forces and Islamists 
on the other – it was a de facto war between clans. The role of ideology, includ-
ing radical Islam, was only a secondary derivative of the politically, socially 
and economically based tensions between the clans. Efforts to increase the role 
of ideology, by the participation of foreign radicals among others, were unsuc-
cessful2. During the course of the war the opposition was unable to gain power, 
and after the alteration of the geopolitical situation3, both sides signed a peace 
agreement in Moscow, under which the UTO was to be integrated into state 
structures, receiving 30% of the state posts, and begin to function as a legal 
political entity, known as the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan. 
The situation was different in Uzbekistan’s Fergana Valley, where the erosion 
of the state, social crisis and ethnic tensions (at times involving violence)4 led 
in 1991 to a power vacuum being formed on a local level; this was filled in by 
Islamist organisations, the largest being Adolat (Justice), operating in Naman-
gan. The Islamists established local councils, and volunteer Muslim militias 
began patrolling the streets and attempting to implement the observance of 
sharia. In contrast to the Tajik Islamists, who at the time were less radical and 
based their authority on clan position, the leaders of Adolat (Tohir Yuldashev 
and Juma Namangani5) were young, and their actions their mainly driven by 
1 The civil war in Tajikistan lasted from 1992 to 1997, resulted in up to 100,000 deaths, and the 
creation of about 1.2 million refugees and internally displaced persons. 
2 One example of that is the unsuccessful attempts of the Saudi terrorist Khattab, who to-
gether with his small unit briefly fought in Tajikistan on the side of the UTO. 
3 The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (after seizing Kabul in 1996) caused all external actors 
who influenced the situation in Tajikistan to become interested in stabilising the situation in the 
country. During the civil war Russia and Uzbekistan supported the government forces, while 
Iran and the Tajik forces in Afghanistan (mainly Ahmad Shah Massoud) supported the UTO.
4 For example the massacre of the Meskhetian Turks in 1988 and the ethnic conflict between 
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in 1990, both of which took place in the Kyrgyz part of the Fergana Valley. 
5 Real name Jumaboy Khojayev, a former Soviet soldier and a veteran of the intervention in 
Afghanistan, who after return to the USSR became a Muslim; he is better known under his 
nom de guerre Juma Namangani. 
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their own, often shallow, interpretation of Islam6. After unsuccessful attempts 
to widen their operations and join the structures of the newly formed state7, 
the Islamist organisations, due to the consolidation of power by Islam Karimov, 
were suppressed by the Uzbek authorities in early 1992, with their members 
being either arrested or forced to flee to Tajikistan, where the civil war was al-
ready raging. Some of the escapees took part in the civil war on the UTO’s side, 
such as the Namangan Battalion8 under the command of Namangani, but their 
role was limited and was only important on a tactical level. 
2. the failure of radical islamic militancy
The end of the civil war in Tajikistan caused a divide within the Islamists – 
some of the opposition warlords accepted the terms of the peace treaty and 
joined the state structures, while others decided to continue the fight and 
control remote areas in the country or continue marauding9. After strength-
ening itself, the central government undertook several initiatives against 
the remnants of the warlords, who were either liquidated or forced to seek 
refuge in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. The Uzbek radicals who settled 
in Tajikistan became the only authentic force of radical Islamic militancy at 
that time, yet at first they too withdrew from armed struggle. However, by 
1998 Yuldashev and Namangani had established the Islamic Movement of Uz-
bekistan (IMU), with the goal of toppling the Karimov regime and establish-
ing an Islamic state in the Fergana Valley. The Uzbeks’ presence in Tajikistan 
was tolerated by Dushanbe at the time, due to the support they were enjoying 
from their former comrades in arms (who now were part of the government), 
and their role as a counterbalance to Uzbekistan’s policies aimed against 
6 Even Yuldashev admitted to having limited knowledge at the time of what Islam and sharia 
were. Based on Yuldashev’s statements in Obrashcheniya 1, available at http://www.jun-
durrahmon.com/jundulloh_filmlar/rus_tili/obrashenie_1.avi 
7 In April of 1991 Yuldashev invited Islam Karimov, the leader of then still communist Uzbeki-
stan, to Namangan. In December of the same year, after Uzbekistan had already declared its 
independence, Yuldashev and Karimov met in Namangan. During the meeting Yuldashev 
presented Adolat’s successes in establishing order and proper social conduct, and proposed 
that the group extend its operations to the rest of the Fergana Valley, and potentially the 
whole country, under the auspices of the state. The idea was rejected by Karimov, and the 
encounter contributed to Karimov’s ferocity in combating Islam in Uzbekistan. 
8 Whole families fled to Tajikistan, which caused the later division of the movement into 
combat and ‘civilian’ elements. 
9 For example the warlords Mullah Abdullah and Ali Bedaki, who did not accept the peace 
treaty and continued the fight, yet their Islamism did not influence their actions in a sub-
stantial manner. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
11
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
11
/2
01
3
Tajikistan (for example Tashkent’s support for the coup by Colonel Khuday-
berdiyev in 199810). 
Uzbekistan’s pressure on Tajikistan (accusing the IMU of conducting a series of 
bomb attacks in Tashkent in February 1999, probably orchestrated by the Uz-
bek authorities), as well as IMU’s connections with the Taliban, caused the au-
thorities in Dushanbe to change their position on the IMU, and to start putting 
pressure on the movement to leave the country. The IMU’s form of escape for-
ward was an attempt to destabilise the region by conducting a raid on the Bat-
ken district in the southern Kyrgyzstan, on the outskirts of the Fergana Valley 
in the summer of 1999. The goal of the raid was to reach the Uzbek part of the 
Fergana Valley and initiate an Islamic revolution against Karimov. However, 
the outnumbered IMU fighters were unable to overcome the Kyrgyz forces, and 
after several weeks of negotiations an informal settlement was reached, under 
which the IMU withdrew and partially moved into Taliban-controlled north-
ern Afghanistan11. In 2000, the IMU repeated the attempt, deploying larger 
forces, and also operating in Uzbekistan, yet the raid ended in failure again12. 
The result of this was the movement’s complete withdrawal from Tajikistan to 
Afghanistan, with political and logistical support from Dushanbe and Moscow 
(for example vehicles of the Russian 201st Division stationed in Tajikistan were 
used to transport the IMU militants and their families)13. 
After the transfer to Afghanistan, the IMU acquired a permanent infrastruc-
ture (for example training camps) and became an organisation with not mere-
ly Uzbeks as members, but also Islamic radicals from all the states of Central 
Asia. It intensified its contacts not only with the Taliban, who gave them great 
freedom of action in the north of the country in return for their support in the 
civil war against the Northern Alliance, but also with the international ter-
rorist organisations, such as al-Qaida and other radicals enjoying the Taliban’s 
hospitality, such as Uyghur and Pakistani Islamists. In 2001 during the Amer-
ican-led Enduring Freedom operation, aimed against al-Qaida and Taliban, 
the IMU became a vanguard of the Taliban forces in the north of the country, 
with Namangani becoming the commander-in-chief of all Taliban forces in the 
10 A coup attempt in the north of the country (Khojent) in November of 1998, undertaken by 
a former Tajik army colonel Mahmud Khudayberdiyev, supported by Uzbekistan. 
11 The IMU forces taking part in the raid were about 300 men strong. 
12 The IMU forces were about 600 men strong, and combat also took place on the territory of 
Uzbekistan, in the Surkhandariya district and in the region of Yangyabad, near Tashkent. 
13 Rashid, Jihad. The rise of militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale University Press 2002, page 164.
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north. During the course of the fighting, the movement suffered heavy losses14 
and was forced to flee to the Tribal Territories in Pakistan. 
The failure of the Batken raids in 1999 and 2000, and later the failure of the 
Taliban and IMU forces during the operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, ended 
the first stage of radical Islamic militancy in Central Asia. This phase was char-
acterised by the attempts made by radicals to take over power via revolution or 
military actions, exploiting the weakness of the newly formed state structures 
of the region’s countries. However, neither the public support which the Islam-
ists had hoped for, nor the forces of the radicals, were sufficient to topple the 
local regimes. 
3. occurrences of islamic radicalism in central asia after 2001
After the 9/11 attacks, the level of activity of the Islamic radicals in Central 
Asia dropped drastically, and its character altered significantly. The most ac-
tive circles (mainly the IMU) were forced to resettle to areas remote from the 
region, and except for a few isolated attempts to continue the armed struggle 
in Central Asia (IJU attacks in 200415), limited their activities to propaganda 
and recruitment. In contrast, there were numerous instances of the local au-
thorities reporting the involvement of radical Islamists in several incidents 
that took place in the region during that time. In some cases such incidents 
occurred as a result of growing social problems, or ethnic tensions; attribut-
ing their causality to radical organisations was used instrumentally to combat 
opposition, tighten the state’s control over the society and legitimise the above 
actions on the international arena. In other cases (such as the clashes in Kara-
tegin in Tajikistan in 2009), the confrontational actions of the authorities led to 
clashes with the local informal groups (which often had claimed to be Islamic), 
yet first of all these incidents should be viewed as attempts by the central au-
thorities to subordinate these groups, and not as actions initiated by organised 
radical Islamic militants. 
14 Reaching about 50% of the strength of the combat units, including Juma Namangani, one of 
the movement’s leaders and founders. 
15 In March and April 2004, the IJU perpetrated attacks on government targets in Tashkent 
and Bukhara, which was met by decisive responses from the authorities. As a result of 
these clashes, most of the casualties were suffered by the terrorists themselves (33 out of 
47 deaths), In July of the same year the organisation also conducted suicide attacks on the 
embassies of the USA and Israel in Tashkent (4 fatalities, including 2 perpetrators). Based 
on Ronald Sandree, Islamic Jihad Union, NEFA Foundation 2008. Available at http://www.
nefafoundation.org/file/FeaturedDocs/nefaijuoct08.pdf
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One case in which a rebellion against the authorities was partially caused by 
Islamic factors was the unsuccessful uprising in the Uzbek city of Andijan16. 
However, despite the Islamic background to this case, the main reasons for 
the protests were the repressive policies of the authorities and social tensions, 
while the driving force came from adherents of branches of Islam traditional 
to the region, and not the radical Islamic militants, who are mostly Salafists. 
In May 2005 leaders of the local popular informal group Akromiya17 were ar-
rested in Andijan, which led directly to the protests; these turned into an as-
sault on the prison where the detainees were being held, and ended up with the 
crowd taking control over the city. After several days, on 13 May, the authori-
ties deployed internal troops to the city; they opened fire on the protesters, 
killing from 800 to as many as 1500 people, depending on the sources. After 
the massacre in Andijan, Karimov was blamed him for provoking the incident. 
Irrespective of whether this is true or not, the event allowed the government in 
Tashkent to put down the social unrest and show the public of Uzbekistan that 
attempts to change the regime, or even exert influence over it, would be met 
with a strong response from the authorities (these events took place shortly 
after the successful revolution in Kyrgyzstan, which at that time was unprec-
edented in the region). 
One instance of actual activity by radical Islamic militants in Central Asia was 
the incidents in Kazakhstan which began in the second half of 2011, and the at-
tempts by Islamist terrorist organisations to influence the situation. Kazakh-
stan at the time had witnessed an unprecedented series of terrorist attacks 
(mainly in Western Kazakhstan), committed by local Salafists. The acts were, 
amongst other factors, caused by the authorities’ repression of the Salafists 
(who acted in an ad hoc and uncoordinated manner), and did not present a case 
of broader struggle for the Islamisation of the country. The established radical 
organisations did undertake several attempts to influence the course of action, 
however apart from a few instances, it is impossible to claim that they were 
really behind the occurrences. Despite the limited scale and effects of the inci-
dents, the fact that the radical Islamic militants took interest in Kazakhstan, 
makes a new and disturbing quality18. 
16 Also in adjacent locations on a smaller scale. 
17 It was an informal religious business group, with a strong Sufi background. 
18 See more in section IV.3, Central Asia and Russia.
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4. radical islamic militants from central asia in pakistan
Despite a drop in their activity in Central Asia after 2001, the radical Islamic 
militants from Central Asia (who at that time were mainly concentrated in the 
IMU) did not cease to exist. After the overthrow of the Taliban, who had pro-
vided them with hospitality, the IMU members fled to the Pakistani tribal ter-
ritories (mainly Waziristan). The IMU was in a difficult situation at that period: 
during the fighting it suffered heavy losses, and as a result of the escape, found 
itself far away from its traditional areas of operation, uprooted and lacking the 
means to function as an organisation. Despite such a difficult situation, radical 
Islamic militants from Central Asia managed to adapt to the new reality, and 
after some time – despite difficulties (such as a split within the IMU) – they 
even started to achieve some successes. This was partially because they did 
not have any other options for survival, either as a movement or as individual 
members, other than continuing the armed struggle on a new territory19. 
Yuldashev, the only IMU leader alive, at first concentrated mainly on rebuild-
ing the movement’s capabilities in Southern Waziristan; the command struc-
tures were recreated, new sources of income were searched (initially the rev-
enues from agriculture carried out by movement’s members)20, and recruit-
ment of volunteers from Central Asia was restarted. Another area of activity 
was securing the favour of influential Pashtun clans through various means, 
for example by arranged marriages, or sermons delivered by Yuldashev (who 
learned Pashto) in the local mosques21. 
This strategy enabled the survival of the movement and the restoration of its 
capabilities, yet also led to its permanent placement in the complicated and 
dynamic scene of the Pakistani Tribal Territories, with their ethnic and clan 
diversity, and the power plays of the Pakistani army and intelligence; as well 
as the presence of other influential actors such as criminal groups (for exam-
ple smuggling mafias) or terrorist organisations (such as the predominantly 
Arab al-Qaida). This had a crucial influence over the IMU’s subsequent activi-
19 Members of the IMU could not simply relocate elsewhere, or return to their homeland. Al-
though after the amnesty declared by Karimov in 2002, a small number of IMU militants 
did return to Uzbekistan, they were often persecuted; http://www.fergananews.com/arti-
cle.php?id=4348 
20 The IMU, both then and now, is not composed only of militants, but also their families. See 
more in Chapter III, Characteristics of the activity of Islamic radicals from Central Asia.
21 David Witter, Uzbek militancy in Pakistan’s tribal region, Institute for the Study of War 2011. 
Available at http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/BackgrounderIMU_28Jan.pdf 
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ties – when Pakistan, pressured by the USA, began attempts to clear South Wa-
ziristan of foreign fighters and Pashtun elements hostile towards Islamabad22, 
the IMU together with the Pashtun forces allied with it started to be attacked 
with full force23. Yuldashev saw himself as having been betrayed by Islama-
bad24, and as an imperative of survival chose the strategy of fighting the Pa-
kistani forces, which led to IMU’s further involvement in the intra-Pashtun 
political setup. The Pakistani government forces were never able to overpower 
the IMU directly, although the movement suffered heavy losses in combat, and 
was forced to change its location and patron several times as a result of Islama-
bad’s skilful playing out of the local animosities25. The situation was subject 
to change only after Yuldashev’s death in 200926, when a new generation of 
leaders rose to power in the IMU27, and the movement’s activities gained their 
current shape (see further in Chapter II. Current profile of the radical Islamic 
militants). 
From the beginning of the IMU’s stay in Pakistan, not all the members of the 
movement agreed with Yuldashev’s anti-Pakistani strategy, the cost of which 
was the lack of armed struggle in Central Asia. Some of the militants, asso-
ciated mainly with Namangani, decided that the fight in Central Asia should 
continue, and in 2004 (or even as early as in 2002, according to other sourc-
22 This was caused by the strategy chosen after 9/11 by Pakistan’s president Pervez Musharraf 
– covert support for the Taliban, while simultaneously combating the insubordinate and 
often hostile local Pashtun commanders. This allowed him to balance between the under-
takings given to the USA, and the pressure from Pakistani army and intelligence (ISI) to 
support their former allies, the Taliban. Based on Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan. The 
path to catastrophe and killing of Benazir Bhutto, Penguin Books 2008 pages 36, 43 and 46.
23 The first minor skirmishes with IMU took place in 2002, although at the time the move-
ment’s militants declined combat and hid from the Pakistani forces. The first real battles 
took place in 2004. Witter, op. cit. 
24 Yuldashev stayed in Pakistan from 1995 to 1998, probably having contact with the ISI; also, 
some of the IMU’s militants and leaders were flown out of the city of Kunduz (which was 
besieged by the Northern Alliance), by the Pakistani air force (the so-called ‘airlift of evil’). 
Based on Ahmed Rashid, Jihad. The rise…, page 140; and Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos. 
How the war against Islamic extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central 
Asia, Penguin Books 2008, page 92. 
25 At first the IMU was supported by the clans of the Waziri tribe, but in 2004 they split; some 
clans continued to support the movement, while others were hostile towards it. The culmi-
nation of the standoff was the so-called ‘Uzbek War’ in 2007, as a consequence of which the 
IMU was forced to resettle and change their patron to the Tehrik-e Taliban-e Pakistan. 
26 Yuldashev died on 27 August 2009 as a result of an American drone attack, conducted at 
the request of the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, General Kayani. Based on a leaked 
American cable available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09ISLAMABAD365.html# 
27 Usman Odil and his deputy Abbas Mansour, an ethnic Kyrgyz. 
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es28), Najimin Jalolov and Suhail Buranov, together with their followers, left 
the IMU and established a new, much smaller organisation, called the Islamic 
Jihad Union29. The IJU aligned itself with the ISI-supported Haqqani Network 
(in return for their patronage, the IJU joined the fight against NATO forces in 
Afghanistan), and in 2004 conducted a series of attacks in Uzbekistan. The at-
tacks were not as effective as the IJU expected, and were complicated and ex-
pensive to plan and execute due to the high level of supervision and control 
over society in Uzbekistan. Because of this, the IJU gave up the idea of waging 
jihad in Central Asia, and concentrated on fighting in Afghanistan alongside of 
the Taliban, and on intensifying cooperation with other international terror-
ist organisations (mainly al-Qaida) in the recruitment and training of radicals 
from Western Europe, in which the organisation noted several successes (for 
example the IJU’s recruitment of about 80 German citizens)30. 
28 Sandree, op. cit.
29 Ibid. 
30 See more in chapter IV.4, Europe and global activities. 
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ii. current profile of tHe radical islamic 
militants from central asia 
Currently, radical Islamic militants from Central Asia are concentrated around 
two distinct, yet similar and cooperating organisations: the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union. These organisations, despite their 
Central Asian origin and character, are part of a network of international ter-
rorism, based in Pakistan and concentrated around al-Qaida31. These organisa-
tions’ members are Islamic radicals not only from Central Asia, but also from 
other countries of the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, South Asia, Turkey 
and even Western Europe. The range of the IMU’s and IJU’s activities, includ-
ing the strictly terrorist ones, has also evolved beyond the traditional region of 
interest, now reaching a global scale.
1. strength and ethnic composition
Most probably the strength of the IMU is about 10,000 people, including about 
3000 militants32, with the IJU being much smaller, probably around several 
hundred to a thousand militants strong33. There are a number of problems 
with calculating the exact strength of the IMU and IJU – the vast inflow and 
outflow of volunteers to the training camps, the groups’ structural amor-
phism and often the lack of formal membership in the organisations34, as 
well as fact that they are in fact composed of two elements – combat (active 
militants) and ‘civilian’, comprised of their families, women, the elderly and 
children. The ethnic composition of the IMU and IJU is diverse, and along-
side the militants from Central Asia35, there are Afghans (mainly Uzbeks, but 
also Turkmens and Tajiks), Russian citizens36, Uyghurs, Turks, volunteers 
from Western Europe (both migrants from the Muslim countries as well as 
31 The so-called ‘core’ of al-Qaida is a small terrorist organisation with predominantly Arab 
Muslim radicals as members; it is based in Pakistan, but serves as a patron to a number of 
organisations worldwide. This is the so-called ‘al-Qaida franchise’, such as ‘al-Qaida in the 
Arabian Peninsula’ or ‘al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb’. The main strength of al-Qaida in 
Pakistan is its ability to acquire funds. 
32 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/06/special_operations_f_4.php 
33 Sandree, op. cit. 
34 This is especially apparent in the case of IMU militants in Afghanistan. See further in chap-
ter III.2, Structural amorphism and operational mobility. 
35 Mainly from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but also from Kazakhstan and Turk-
menistan. Based on materials published by the IMU, available at http://www.furqon.com/. 
36 Predominantly Tatars, but also volunteers from the Caucasus (despite speculations, there are 
no Chechens amongst them) and even ethnic Russians who have converted to Islam. Ibid. 
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ethnic Germans – who have converted to Islam), small numbers of Pashtuns 
from Pakistan, and also even Americans, Burmese and Indonesians in their 
ranks. Based on the available information37, we can tell that the core of the 
movement is made up of the militants from Central Asia and Afghanistan, 
and amongst the other groups most visible are German (perhaps as many as 
200 people in the IMU and IJU)38 and Russian citizens (around several dozen 
people).
2. leaders
Despite the presence of many ethnic groups in the IMU and IJU, the crucial 
role is still being played by the Uzbeks, who shape the vector of the organisa-
tions’ activities, become their amirs (leaders) and rule the organisations in 
an authoritarian fashion. After the death of Yuldashev in 2009, his deputy 
and son-in-law Usman Odil became the amir39 and gave the organisation its 
current shape. After Odil’s death in 2012 the leadership was taken by Usman 
Gazi40 (previously known as Abdulfatah Ahmadi), who originates from Uz-
bekistan, was previously one of Yuldashev’s deputies41, and continues the un-
dertakings of his predecessor. The current leader of the IJU is Abdullah Fatih, 
also from Uzbekistan, who took power in 2009 after the death of Najimin 
Jalolov (who had previously been associated with one of the IMU’s founders, 
Namangani)42. 
3. manifesto
In the manifesto of the radical Islamic militants from Central Asia, emphasis 
is laid on political issues, with Islam playing a secondary yet important role. 
37 A list of the movement’s martyrs in 2011, published by the IMU, included 87 names, of which 
64 people originated from Afghanistan, and only 20 from Central Asia. However, due to the 
character of the IMU’s operations in 2011, it is not possible to extrapolate these proportions 
to the scale of the whole organisation; http://furqon.com/2011-09-16-11-34-50.html 
38 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/disillusioned-german-islamists-returning-
home-to-germany-a-844799.html 
39 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39900&tx_
ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=36ef48745c0c3eedb9b79c033675b084 
40 Ibid. 
41 Based on the IMU film Tema Mojaheda, available at http://www.jundurrahmon.com/jun-
dulloh_filmlar/rus_tili/tema-mujahida-1.avi 
42 IJU statement available at: http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=13863 and Sandree, 
op. cit. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
19
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
11
/2
01
3
As their ultimate goal the IMU and IJU list the creation of an Islamic state in 
Central Asia43. During the last several years, issues of the fight against the 
broadly understood West have also appeared in the IMU and IJU’s ideology, 
which is a result of the influence of international terrorist organisations44. 
Matters relating strictly to religion, such as theological questions, are not 
widely discussed, in contrast to other Islamic terrorist organisations, and the 
movement itself has members from different branches of Sunni Islam45 (see 
further in chapter III.3, The universalisation and globalisation of Islamic ter-
rorism). Both organisations view terrorist actions, including those aimed at 
civilian targets, as justified and legitimate means of struggle, equal to combat 
against armed forces46. 
4. vectors of activity
The IMU and IJU’s activities are characterised by a great diversity of means and 
a far-reaching operational mobility. These organisations can employ a wide 
spectrum of methods to act, ranging from terrorist activity, through guerrilla 
warfare, to regular combat operations. Their activities are also geographically 
dispersed: the IMU and IJU are based in Pakistan, and conduct both combat in 
Afghanistan and terrorist activities on a global scale. 
The IMU and IJU maintain all of their organisational infrastructure (leader-
ship, training camps, the families of militants etc.) in Northern Waziristan in 
Pakistan, the IMU in the Miram Shah region and the IJU in Mir Ali47. This is 
possible thanks to the patronage of the Haqqani Network, and allows for rela-
tively safe operations at the organisations’ rear. At the same time, the strate-
gic direction of IMU’s and IJU’s activity is the fight in northern Afghanistan, 
43 The IMU’s film Znamya Jihada, available at http://www.jundurrahmon.com/jundulloh_
filmlar/rus_tili/znamya_jihada.avi 
44 Visible in the propaganda of IMU and IJU, for example: http://www.jhuf.net/showthread.
php?17737-JundAllah-Studio-Der_Konig_Lowe-Abu-Ibraheem-Al-Alman 
45 Officially the IMU is a Sunni organisation adherent to the Hanafi madhhab (school of Is-
lamic jurisprudence) common in Central Asia, and in the theological dimension (akida) fol-
lowing the teachings of imam Ata Hawi (sic); however, both the statements of the leaders of 
the movement and the actions of the organisation show that it is open for all Sunni radicals. 
Source: Tema Mujaheda 1.
46 Ibid. 
47 David Witter, Uzbek militancy in Pakistan’s tribal region, Institute for the Study of War, 
Washington 2011, available at http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Back-
grounderIMU_web.pdf 
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where the IMU has become a de facto Uzbek wing of the Taliban48 and poses 
a serious threat to the Afghan and ISAF forces49. 
At the same time, the IMU and IJU conduct terrorist activity outside of their 
traditional area of interest (Central Asia, Afghanistan, Waziristan); princi-
pally these organisations specialise in propaganda, recruitment and training 
of Islamic radicals from Western Europe (especially from Germany). This is 
performed both independently (aimed at acquiring volunteers or funds) and as 
a subcontracting service for other terrorist organisations (mainly in the field 
of training). There have also been cases of these groups pursuing such activi-
ties in Russia and South Asia, and even attempts at terrorist acts in the USA50 
(see further in chapter IV. Areas of operation of the radical Islamic militants 
from Central Asia). 
5. acquisition of funds 
The radical militants from Central Asia acquire funds from various sources, 
which can be divided into three basic categories. The first is the business ac-
tivity of the organisations and their members, performed in the Pakistani 
Tribal Territories. It is primarily agriculture, but also trade and construction 
services51. These organisations are also engaged in the trade and trafficking 
of illegal drugs from Afghanistan52. The second category is the financial aid 
from other terrorist organisations, mainly al-Qaida, granted in return for 
the IMU’s and IJU’s participation in joint projects53. The third category in-
volves funds coming from the members and sympathisers of these organisa-
tions, both those migrating to Waziristan and those living abroad and trans-
ferring money to Pakistan. The last is especially true of the Islamic radicals 
living in Europe (amongst others there have been cases of such activity in 
48 Understood as forces fighting in Afghanistan against the ISAF and Afghan forces; subor-
dinate to the so-called Quetta Shura, under the leadership of Mullah Omar, the leader and 
founder of the movement. 
49 Andrew Feitt, Countering the IMU in Afghanistan, Small Wars Journal, available at http://
smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/386-feitt.pdf 
50 http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan_united_states_obama_islamic_movement/ - 
24480474.html 
51 Based on statements regarding the business activity of IMU members in the organisation’s 
film Qaboilda nima gap? 6, available at http://www.jundurrahmon.com/jundulloh_filmlar/
qaboilda6.avi 
52 http://www.rus-obr.ru/ru-web/2965 
53 Predominantly the training of militants, but also joint terrorist actions. 
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Germany54, France55 and the Netherlands56), but also in Russia57, or even the 
United States58. 
6. cooperation with other terrorist organisations
The Islamic radicals from Central Asia cooperate actively with other terror-
ist organisations, the most important of which are al-Qaida, the Haqqani Net-
work59 and the Afghan Taliban. North Waziristan is a place where different 
terrorist circles and organisations meet with each other, and is a destination 
point for Islamic radicals from all over the world. This proximity, as well as the 
congruence of their goals, leads to advanced cooperation between them – on 
one hand, the exchange of information and experience, the transfer of people 
between organisations or financial support; and on the other, the specialisa-
tion of particular organisations in individual aspects of terrorist activity. One 
has to bear in mind that in this region, the particular alliances and connec-
tions are subject to constant change, and that the activity of these organisa-
tions shows that within a short period of time, they can cooperate intensively 
and then turn on each other. Their relationship with Pakistan is similar – while 
radical Islamist circles inside the ISI60 support them, the civil authorities, or 
54 http://tribune.com.pk/story/345977/trial-opens-in-germany-of-suspected-militant-brothers/
55 http://www.rferl.org/content/france-trial-10-alleged-imu-supporters/24788580.html 
56 Ibid. 
57 http://www.rus-obr.ru/ru-web/2965 
58 http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan_united_states_obama_islamic_movement/ - 
24480474.html
59 The Haqqani Network is a terrorist business organisation created during the fight against 
the Soviet forces in Afghanistan by Jalaluddin Haqqani. Currently run by his son Sirajhud-
din Haqqani, it conducts a wide range of armed terrorist activity in Eastern Afghanistan 
and runs a number of prosperous businesses. Its actions are controlled by the Pakistani 
intelligence agency ISI, which utilises it to accomplish its interests in Afghanistan. Based 
on Jeffrey Dressler, The Haqqani Network – a strategic threat, Institute for Study of War, 
Washington 2012, available at http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haq-
qani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf and the hearing before the US Congress of the US 
Chief of Joint Staffs of Admiral Mike Mullen, available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/
statemnt/2011/09%20September/Mullen%2009-22-11.pdf 
60 Inter-Services Intelligence, the most influential intelligence agency in Pakistan, theoreti-
cally subordinate to the General Staff, although in reality having its own goals and strategy, 
as well as conducting its own policies, independent of the army and civilian authorities. Its 
main areas of activity are Afghanistan and Kashmir, where it maintains a number of subor-
dinate terrorist organisations. The ISI is not monolithic; there are several groups within it, 
including a radical Islamic wing, which supports the Islamic terrorist organisations. Most 
probably these circles were responsible for harbouring Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad; see 
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue47.pdf
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even the army, can combat them, and the terrorist organisations can conduct 
actions against them. 
In the case of the IMU and IJU, this kind of cooperation means participation in 
joint actions with other terrorist organisations61, conducting activities in West-
ern Europe, and giving Islamic radicals from around the world combat train-
ing, partially on the behalf of the rather compact al-Qaida62; as well as running 
combat operations in northern Afghanistan, on behalf of the Afghan Taliban 
and the Haqqani Network (which is part of the so-called Quetta Shura63). In the 
past the IMU has also intensively cooperated with the Tehrik-e Taliban-e Paki-
stan, the so-called ‘Pakistani Taliban’, and currently signs of renewed coopera-
tion between them are visible64. 
61 For example, the attack on the Bagram Airbase, the largest American base in Afghanistan, 
in July 2010. Described in the IMU film Fidali Ali, available at http://www.jundurrahmon.
com/jundulloh_filmlar/ali_mergan_russian.avi 
62 Witter, op. cit. 
63 Quetta Shura – the council of the most important Taliban leaders, established after the de-
feat in Afghanistan, by the movement’s leader Mullah Omar in the Pakistani city of Quetta. 
64 http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=44576 
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iii. cHaracteristics of tHe activity of islamic 
radicals from central asia
The activity of the radical Islamic militants from Central Asia concentrated 
in the IMU and IJU is multidimensional, and shows not only the highly devel-
oped adaptation skills of these organisations, but also the general dynamic of 
the far-reaching changes in the functioning of Islamic terrorist organisations. 
The first category primarily includes combat versatility (i.e. the wide range of 
means these organisations employ); structural amorphism (for example, the 
transfer of people between different circles and terrorist organisations); and 
operational mobility, i.e. the ability to conduct operations at many different, 
remote theatres of action. The second category includes intensified coopera-
tion between organisations, which leads to their far-reaching specialisation; 
as well as the globalisation and digitalisation of Islamic terrorism, which fa-
cilitates both the contacts between different groups and the radicalisation and 
recruitment of the Islamists worldwide. 
1. combat versatility
The essence of the IMU’s and IJU’s activities are their combat actions. These or-
ganisations have proven their ability to conduct diverse combat actions, show-
ing both their skills at adaptation, as well as the scale of the threats associated 
with them. The IMU and IJU are capable of conducting regular military opera-
tions (such as the clashes in South Waziristan in 200765), guerrilla warfare (the 
raids in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000, operations in Afghanistan), as well as 
a whole spectrum of strictly terrorist actions. The latter include attacks utilis-
ing improvised explosive devices (IEDs, used mainly in Pakistan66), attacks uti-
lising IEDs placed on vehicles (VBIEDs, used in Pakistan and Afghanistan; the 
IMU and IJU have shown great innovativeness in this field)67, suicide attacks 
(usually aimed against representatives of authorities68, albeit not only: for ex-
65 Clashes between the local Pashtun units supported by the Pakistani army and the IMU 
forces and the Pashtun clans allied with it; dubbed the ‘Uzbek War’ in Pakistan; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/04/the_talibans_interne.php 
66 Apparent in the materials published by the IMU, such as Vesti iz Pakistana 2, available 
at http://furqon.com/images/stories/videos/fbp2_russian.avi
67 The wide combat experience of the IMU and IJU, as well as their members with an appro-
priate technical education (for example electricians), allow them to construct complicated 
devices of this type. Ibid. 
68 http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/2106-kunduz-police-chief-killed-in-suicide-
attack
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ample the attack on the American Provincial Reconstruction Team in Panjshir 
in 201169) conducted also by women70, and suicide raids similar to the one ex-
ecuted by Lashkar-e Taiba in Mumbai in 2008 (the so-called Mumbai-style at-
tacks71) conducted by the IMU and IJU, for example in Afghanistan against the 
Bagram Airbase in 2010, but also planned in several places in Europe72. 
The IMU and IJU possess a wide arsenal of weapons and equipment. Apart from 
firearms and explosive materials (as well as the means to produce them), these 
organisations have mortars, large-calibre machine guns, recoilless rifles, 
BM-1 rocket rounds and home-made copies of the latter73. IMU and IJU mili-
tants also utilise modern military equipment, such as night-vision, bulletproof 
vests, Kevlar helmets and advanced communication sets, which is uncommon 
amongst terrorist organisations74. 
A distinct trait of the IMU’s and IJU’s militant activity is the high level of their 
militants’ training and their use of complex combat tactics. The IMU was es-
tablished by people who were veterans of the war in Afghanistan, or who had 
at least gone through compulsory military service in the USSR, where they 
were given appropriate training. In the later stages of the movement, the com-
bat training of the new members remained comparable to that employed in the 
regular armed forces75. Similarly the combat tactics (including reconnaissance 
69 http://tribune.com.pk/story/274646/suicide-attack-on-afghanistan-us-facility-kills-two/ 
as well as the IMU’s statement: http://furqon.com/2011-09-08-02-30-52/2011-11-20-17-32-
45/184-2011-11-25-07-03-24.html 
70 The IMU and IJU actively engage women in their actions. Based on IMU materials: the 
film Nastavleniye sestyor, available at http://furqon.com/images/stories/videos/nastav-
lenyas.avi, an IMU statement about a suicide attack conducted by a woman in 2012, avail-
able at http://www.jhuf.net/showthread.php?17955; and http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2012 /11/pro-taliban_pakistan.php 
71 Attacks in which in order to maximise casualties, the militants first utilise firearms and 
only then explosive suicide vests. This kind of operation was conducted on a large scale 
for the first time in Mumbai in 2008. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/
analysis_mumbai_atta.php 
72 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/29/terror-attack-plot-europe-foiled 
73 Based on the materials published by the IMU and IJU, such as Vesti iz Pakistana 2, Qaboilda 
nima gap? 2 (available at http://www.jundurrahmon.com/jundulloh_filmlar/qaboilda2.
avi), Qaboilda nima gap? 3 (available at http://www.jundurrahmon.com/jundulloh_filmlar/
qaboilda3.avi).
74 Feitt, op. cit. 
75 Such as military drilling, physical exercises, training in the use of firearms, explosive ma-
terials, navigation, communication and group tactical coordination. Based on the IMU ma-
terials Tema Mojaheda 1, Znamya Jihada, and Qaboilda nima gap? 8 (available at: http://
www.jundurrahmon.com/jundulloh_filmlar/qaboilda8.avi ).
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
25
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
11
/2
01
3
and planning) were taken from those used by the regular armies, and are be-
ing constantly improved by the IMU and IJU. They also train the children of 
the organisations’ members, with IMU even having its own madrassa in which 
children are subjected to indoctrination and military training76.
The above factors mean that the radical Islamic militants from Central Asia 
have, on a tactical level, become a serious adversary to the coalition forces in 
Afghanistan77, and an attractive subcontractor (mainly in the field of training) 
for other Islamic terrorist organisations (mainly al-Qaida; see further in chap-
ter III.3, The universalisation and globalisation of Islamic terrorism). 
2. structural amorphism and operational mobility
An important trait of the IMU’s and IJU’s activity is their far-going structural 
amorphism and operational mobility – the capability to alter the organisation’s 
operation and establish its activities in new areas. Several factors contribute 
to this phenomena, such as the lack of a permanent and unified command 
structure on the scale of the whole organisation; the lack of a unified model of 
membership in the organisation, and the ease of transferring people between 
various terrorist organisations. This gives the radical Islamic militants from 
Central Asia the ability to conduct actions on a wider than regional scale, and 
to influence a growing number of circles and environments, while keeping the 
organisation steerable and maintaining its Central Asian character. 
The IMU and IJU do not have an unified organisational structure – this refers 
not only to the changes in structure associated with the evolution of these or-
ganisations, but above all to their internal structural diversity and mobility. 
Everything is based mainly on personal connections, which facilitates the 
task-based management of people and units according to the organisation’s 
current needs – without the need to formalise its structure into unified form, 
but with the ability to easily implement rapid changes in case of necessity. This 
also makes it easier to conduct effective actions in remote operational theatres 
and set up new ones quickly78. 
76 The Abdullah ibn Zybair madrassa. Based on Quaboilda nima gap? 8.
77 Feitt, op. cit.
78 Based on the analysis of biographies of members and descriptions of the situation inside the 
movement found in materials published by the IMU, such as statements, lists and audio-
visual materials, published on internet jihadi forums, amongst other sites. 
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The IMU and IJU do not have a unified model of membership. The organisa-
tions include both members who are fully committed to the cause – “full-time 
militants” – as well as those who only help the organisations in its opera-
tions. Some of the people assisting, or even fighting in the ranks of the IMU 
and IJU, are possibly not even aware of being a part of the organisation, which 
is primarily the case with the Uzbeks fighting under the IMU’s command in 
northern Afghanistan79. The transfer of personnel between individual terror-
ist organisations active in Waziristan additionally strengthens the IMU and 
IJU’s structural amorphism. This phenomena occurs when a terrorist organi-
sation transfers its members to another organisation in order to achieve com-
mon goals. In the case of the IMU and IJU these are mainly al-Qaida members 
who enter the ranks of these organisations in order to gain more opportunities 
while working on joint projects80.
The above factors mean that the IMU and IJU are very internally diverse organ-
isations. Currently they consist of overt units and an infrastructure, subordi-
nated directly to the amir (the IMU and IJU in Waziristan)81; units functioning 
in the same area independently from each other, but coordinated by the amir in 
Waziristan (such as the IMU in northern Afghanistan)82; as well as covert cells 
directed at only one kind of activity (for example, recruitment or acquisition of 
funds), which maintain contact with the headquarters of the organisation, but 
enjoy large degrees of autonomy (such as the cells in Central Asia, Russia and 
Germany)83. In addition to that, there are also individuals acting on the behalf 
of IMU and IJU, who often have only limited contact with these organisations 
(Europe, USA, South-Eastern Asia)84. Such a model of functioning allows the 
79 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is known under relatively neutral names, such as Uz-
bek Jamyati/Uzbek Harikati (Uzbek Group/Movement) or Islomi Harikati (Islamic Move-
ment). 
The Islamic Jihad Union is also known as Jamyat Islomi (Islamic Group) and Jihad Jamyati 
(Jihad Group). 
80 For example, cooperation in planning the failed attacks in Europe in 2010 (see further in 
IV.4, Europe and global activities), or the transfer of Moezeddin Garsallaoui from al-Qaida 
to the IJU (see further in IV.3, Central Asia and Russia); http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2012/10/jund_al_khilafah_emi.php 
81 Qaboilda nima gap? 2.
82 Giustozzi Antonio, Reuter Christoph, The Northern Front. The Afghan insurgency spread-
ing beyond the Pashtuns, Afghanistan Analysts Network 2010. Available at http://aan-af-
ghanistan.com/uploads/20100629AGCR-TheNorthernFront1.pdf
83 Based on a description of the captured cells. For example: http://www.fergananews.com/
news/20667
84 One example is the case of Ulugbek Kodirov in the United States. See http://www.rferl.org/
content/uzbekistan_united_states_obama_islamic_movement/24480474.html
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
27
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
11
/2
01
3
IMU and IJU to utilise their available resources efficiently; makes it difficult to 
combat them; and at the same time does not prevent them from being steered. 
3. the universalisation and globalisation of islamic terrorism 
The universalisation and globalisation of Islamic terrorism are processes 
which occur in almost all such organisations, and the IMU and IJU are no ex-
ceptions to this. These processes consist of intensifying the interdependencies 
between Islamic terrorist organisations, widening their social support and so-
cial recruitment base (as well as the ability to reach out to it); and the diverse 
methods (including ones not directly involving violence) that these organisa-
tions can use in their operations (for example thanks to their opening on digi-
tal technologies). This has been made possible due to the redefinition of their 
goals (to operate on a global scale) and ceasing the use of centralised structures 
in favour of the network-based structures – elastic, open to cooperation with 
external partners, and much more efficient. This is especially visible in the 
case of the IMU and IJU, who in the ecosystem of global jihad are playing the 
role of a ‘jihad academy’ – recruiting and training Islamic radicals from coun-
tries far beyond their traditional region of interest.
The rise of cooperation among international Islamic terrorist organisations has 
led to the creation of a system of interdependency, the basic trait of which is the 
specialisation of particular organisations. In the case of those groups active on 
the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, the system is as follows: local organisations 
provide hospitality to the international terrorist organisations (for whom the 
lack of their own territory is a substantial problem), and in return receive either 
financial contributions (from al-Qaida) or assistance in combat actions (from the 
IMU and IJU). Simultaneously, there is analogous cooperation between the in-
ternational terrorist organisations. Al-Qaida – small in strength, but possessing 
considerable funds, which mainly come from donors in the Persian Gulf – finan-
cially supports the IMU and IJU’s actions. In return, these organisations make 
concrete efforts to achieve common goals, such as propaganda, recruitment and 
training of Islamic radicals mainly (but not only) from Europe85 (see further in 
chapter IV.3, Europe and global activities). For the Islamic radicals from Central 
Asia it is also a way to improve their position (as the operations are being carried 
out under their banner, not al-Qaida’s), as well as the prestige and attractiveness 
of these organisations (which facilitates the further recruitment of volunteers). 
85 Witter, op. cit. 
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An important element of the universalisation of Islamic terrorism, also in the 
case of IMU and IJU, is its digitalisation and broadening distribution. These 
phenomena are coupled with each other: on one hand, due to the rise of impor-
tance of radical Islam worldwide, the social base for operations of the Islamic 
terrorist organisations is increasing; and on the other, due to the wide usage of 
digital tools by these organisations, they are able not only to reach out to and 
recruit radicals, but also to contribute to the intensification of the radicalisa-
tion process itself. Use of the internet also allows Islamic terrorist organisa-
tions, geographically remote from each other, to exchange ideas and experi-
ences, and for Islamic radicals worldwide to establish contact with them easily.
The IMU and IJU are very active in this field, utilising a wide array of means 
and conducting actions calculated on effecting several locations simultane-
ously. These organisations have their own websites86, are active on the inter-
net jihadi forums87 and online social networking services88, and also produce 
and publish audiovisual propaganda materials in a number of languages89. 
The scale of the phenomena can be illustrated by the numbers: up to date, the 
IMU has created about 170 propaganda films (in at least 10 languages), of which 
about 20 are in English, 20 in Russian, and over 30 in German. These films are 
also being translated to other languages, such as French, Indonesian, Burmese, 
Urdu and Arabic90. The IMU and IJU’s activity in this field is aimed not only at 
the recruitment of Islamic radicals from European countries (predominantly 
Germany), South Asia and even the United States91, but also at the radicalisation 
(and possibly later recruitment) of the Muslim population in Central Asia92. 
In this case, the IMU and IJU have succeeded in developing a mechanism for 
86 The IMU’s website is at http://www.furqon.com/, http://www.jundurrahmon.com, the IJU’s 
–at http://www.sehadetzamani.com, http://sodiqlar.info These websites serve as platforms 
to distribute the organisations’ materials, although they are subject to frequent blockades 
and hacker attacks, and so the IMU and IJU now more frequently use internet forums. 
87 Such as Ansar al Muajahideen, the largest jihadi forum in English (http://www.ansar1.
info) or the Jamia Hafsa Forum (http://www.jhuf.net/forum.php).
88 For example, activity on the Facebook website https://www.facebook.com/mujohid, or https://
www.facebook.com/IMU313, as well as high activity on YouTube, for example: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=X2GT1OD8Nmo, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JYne9sPQhX4 
89 The IMU and IJU have their own propaganda film studios, the Jundullah Studio (IMU) and 
Badr al-Tawheed (IJU), which create and distribute propaganda materials, mainly films, but 
also audio podcasts. 
90 Based on list of films available at the IMU’s website (http://furqon.com/2011-09-08-02-37-
00.html) and those published on the jihadi forums. 
91 Radicalising the Uzbek community in USA via the internet. 
92 The presence of a large number of propaganda materials in Uzbek or Tajik, but also Russian. 
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distributing the propaganda materials, bypassing the internet blockades and 
monitoring present in many countries of the region93.
The process of universalisation has also met with favourable conditions inside 
the IMU and IJU. These organisations do not have a precise ideological and 
theological framework within militant radical Sunni Islam94. This allows them 
to reach out to radicals from different environments and circles, and to incor-
porate multiple ideological narratives without the need to concentrate or de-
clare in favour of a particular one95. In IMU and IJU propaganda, fighting the 
Karimov regime96, the corruption of Western civilisation97, betrayal of Islam 
by the Pakistani civilian authorities98, combating the ISAF forces in Afghani-
stan99 or even the persecution of the Muslim Rohingya people by the military 
junta in Burma100 are interwoven. It is largely this approach that has made the 
operational mobility of IMU and IJU described earlier possible. However, it also 
encompasses certain limitations for these organisations; they cannot permit 
themselves any direct engagement in problems, such as ethnic tensions which 
involve animosities between the groups whose representatives represented in 
the IMU and IJU101.
93 Which consists of publishing films online in Russian, Uzbek and Tajik in the 3gp format 
dedicated for the mobile phones. Such a film is then downloaded in a country without inter-
net blockade, smuggled into Central Asia on mobile devices, and later distributed through 
the Bluetooth protocol. 
94 Based on the statements made by IMU leaders in Obrashcheniya 1. 
95 The IMU and IJU’s ranks also include Islamists who adhere to non-radical branches of Sun-
ni Islam (such as Hanafis), as well as those who support other Islamic theological doctrines, 
including radical ones such as Salafism or Deobandism. Similarly the social background of 
the organisations’ members is diverse; despite the specific unity of their goals, a German 
Salafist, a Central Asian Islamist and a Burmese imam have different opinions and world-
views.
96 Obrashcheniya 1.
97 IMU propaganda film Der Muster Muslim, available at http://furqon.com/images/stories/
videos/der_muster_muslim.avi 
98 http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=44576 
99 http://ahyaislam.com/showthread.php?t=634 
100 http://www.jhuf.net/showthread.php?16775-IMU-Jundullah-Studio-presents-A-Lost-Peo-
ple-(about-the-Tragedies-of-Burma)-Al-Mufti-Abu-Dharr-Azzaam-(Hafidhahullaah) 
101 An example of this is the IMU and IJU’s inability to exploit the chaos that occurred in south-
ern Kyrgyzstan during the ethnic conflict between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in 2010. Despite 
speculation of the IMU’s potential involvement in the conflict on the Uzbek side, the or-
ganisation, due to its internal logic of operation and the presence of Kyrgyz in its ranks (at 
even the highest levels – at the time the commander of IMU’s military units was en ethnic 
Kyrgyz, Abbas Mansur; Vesti iz Pakistana 2) – limited its reaction to releasing a lukewarm 
statement condemning the violence between Muslims.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
30
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
11
/2
01
3
iv. areas of operation of tHe radical islamic 
militants from central asia 
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union conduct 
their operations on several, distinct and distant areas simultaneously, which 
is a sign of their operational mobility. In each of these areas, the operations of 
the radical Islamic militants from Central Asia are influenced by different fac-
tors, are conducted in diverse manners, and bring forth varied reactions from 
the other actors. The most important areas of operations for the IMU and IJU 
are Afghanistan, Central Asia (together with Russia) and Western Europe (but 
also other countries, for example the USA). 
1. afghanistan
Afghanistan is the basic and strategic area of operation for the IMU and IJU. 
Their activity there is focused on recruitment and combat in the north of the 
country, where they have become a de facto Uzbek wing of the Taliban. The 
IMU and IJU’s presence in northern Afghanistan poses a threat to ISAF and the 
authorities in Kabul, and is problematic for the Central Asian states, as well as 
for China and Russia. 
Due to its size, the IMU is leading in the actions in Afghanistan, where it has 
succeeded in spreading the insurgency against the authorities in Kabul and 
ISAF forces to the territories inhabited by the ethnic minorities. The Taliban 
were unable to accomplish this due to the strong Pashtun affiliation of the 
movement, while the predominantly Uzbek IMU was capable of conducting 
radicalisation and recruitment among the local Uzbeks (and also Turkmens 
and Tajiks, to a lesser extent) and use them for militancy102. The IJU at first 
fought only alongside the Taliban in the south of the country, but is currently 
also cooperating with the IMU in the north of the country103. 
So far the IMU has mainly participated in fighting in the provinces of Kunduz, 
Takhar, Balkh, Baghlan, Samangan, Jowzjan, Faryab, Badakhshan and Badg-
his, which border Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan104. The IMU’s mo-
102 Giustozzi, Reuter, op. cit. 
103 Based on materials published by the IJU showing the combat of its militants in Afghanistan.
104 Based on the ISAF statements (available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/
index.php) and materials published by the IMU and IJU, for example at http://www.ansar1.
info/showthread.php?t=14438 
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dus operandi in Afghanistan is to recruit members of the local ethnic minori-
ties for combat, which is directed by IMU veterans from Central Asia; the IMU 
headquarters in Waziristan also deploys to Afghanistan experts in such fields 
as communications, explosives etc.105 The IMU’s combat operations in Afghani-
stan include regular combat and occupation of captured terrain106, guerrilla 
warfare and insurgency, such as attempts to seize the water reservoirs in the 
province of Faryab107, or extensive use of improvised explosive devices against 
the Afghan and ISAF forces; together with terrorist actions, such as the nu-
merous suicide attacks108. In the north of Afghanistan, as in other parts of the 
country affected by the insurgency, there is a local shadow administration109. 
Its leaders often originate from the IMU, although they are not fully independ-
ent and operate within a wider ‘shadow government’ structure, managed di-
rectly by the Taliban110. The IMU has shown its ability to perpetrate attacks 
in provinces traditionally hostile towards the Taliban and forces allied with 
them, an example of which are the two attacks conducted by the IMU in Panj-
shir111 (the IMU is the only organisation which has perpetrated attacks in this 
province). 
Combating the IMU in the previously peaceful parts of Afghanistan, due 
to the socio-political situation, is a serious challenge for the ISAF forces and 
Afghan authorities. The current elite of the Uzbek and Tajik communities in 
Afghanistan is divided and lacks a single, undisputed and charismatic leader 
amongst these minorities. This has enabled the IMU to channel the frustration 
of some of the Afghan Uzbeks and even Tajiks, who during the 1996-2001 strug-
gle against the Taliban were in the vanguard of the anti-Taliban forces. This 
creates a danger not only for the local authorities, but also the government in 
Kabul and the ISAF forces, since in all the calculations, it was the north of the 
105 Feitt, op. cit. 
106 For example the skirmishes in the Badakhshan province in May 2013, http://www.ferga-
nanews.com/news/20639
107 http://www.fergananews.com/news/20639
108 Usually aimed against representatives of the local authorities or security forces, such as the 
attack on the chief of police in Kunduz province in March 2011; http://www.tolonews.com/
en/afghanistan/2106-kunduz-police-chief-killed-in-suicide-attack. 
109 Alternative state structures of the Taliban, which include their own governors, judicial and 
tax systems and police. 
110 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/04/20134910314648770.html
111 Attacks in October 2011 and May 2013: http://tribune.com.pk/story/274646/suicide-attack-
on-afghanistan-us-facility-kills-two/ and http://www.jhuf.net/showthread.php?18108-Is-
lamic-Movement-of-Uzbekistan-Notification-of-Martyrdom-Operation-in-the-center-of-
Panjshir-Afghanistan 
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country which was expected to be neutral, or even support the government in 
Kabul. The need to combat the IMU not only draws the forces away from fight-
ing the Taliban in the south and east of the country, but also potentially cre-
ates a possibility of wider involvement of ethnic minorities in the insurgency 
against the authorities in Kabul (see further in chapter V, Perspectives). The 
scale of the efforts which the US and ISAF forces have invested in combating 
the IMU in the north of Afghanistan can be seen by the intensification of the 
raids against the IMU’s regional commanders and specialists; during the first 
five month of 2013 there were 26 such raids (compared to less than 20 last year), 
which are a crucial element of combating the IMU in Afghanistan112. Another 
important element of this strategy is the enduring American campaign against 
the IMU and IJU targets (leaders and infrastructure) in Waziristan, utilising 
unmanned aerial vehicles (drones)113.
2. the regional consequences of imu’s activity in afghanistan 
The IMU’s presence in the north of Afghanistan is very problematic for the 
Central Asian states bordering Afghanistan, but also for China, and indirectly 
Russia also. Most of all the Central Asian states fear the repetition of attempts 
at incursion into the region by radical Islamic militants from the IMU (espe-
cially after the withdrawal of ISAF forces planned for 2014), but also the de-
structive influence of this organisation on their increasingly Islamised socie-
ties114. So far the IMU has shown no interest in initiating direct armed struggle 
in Central Asia (although that does not mean this will continue to be the case 
in the future); despite this, the regimes in these states have blamed the IMU 
for several incidents on their territories115, and have actively utilised the spec-
tre of a return of the IMU to fight Islam in their countries and to receive aid 
112 Based on ISAF statements, available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/in-
dex.php 
113 IMU leaders such as Yuldashev, Usman Odil and Abbas Mansur, as well as other important 
members of the organisation (including some from Europe), have been killed by American 
drone attacks. 
114 The Islamisation of the societies of Central Asia is taking place in all the countries of the re-
gion, and is viewed as a threat by the authorities, who are trying to combat this process, as 
can be seen for example in Uzbekistan (for example the actions of the governor of the Andi-
jan district http://www.centrasia.ru/person2.php?st=1160886886) and Tajikistan (for ex-
ample, the ban on minors entering religious facilities http://tribune.com.pk/story/224080/
tajikistan-bans-muslim-youths-from-praying-in-mosques/). 
115 For example, attributing responsibility for the clashes in Karategin in 2009 to the IMU: 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/09/suicide_bomber_strik_5php 
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(including military aid) from the United States, Western countries, Russia and 
China116. 
The IMU’s activities in Afghanistan have also deepened China’s concerns for the 
stability of Xinjiang and Central Asia. Above all, China is afraid of a rise in Islamic 
radicalism and Uyghur separatism in its western province of Xinjiang, as well as 
intensification of operations by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement117, which cur-
rently is based in Waziristan and has a long history of close contacts with the IMU 
and IJU118. The spill over of potential conflict in Central Asia onto Chinese territory 
is also a threat to China. In order to eliminate the dangerous impact of the situation 
in Afghanistan (including the actions of the IMU and IJU), China has undertaken 
a number of steps to intensify military cooperation with the countries of the region, 
also within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation119.
For Russia, which treats Central Asia as its sphere of influence, the IMU’s activ-
ity in Afghanistan simultaneously presents an opportunity and a challenge. 
In the short term, Moscow has been exploiting the threat of the IMU’s return 
instrumentally in order to secure its interests in the region. In the long term, 
the IMU’s operations in Afghanistan are dangerous for Russia, due to the risk 
of destabilisation of Central Asia associated with them. Most vulnerable are 
the weakest countries of the region, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, with which 
Russia is allied through the CSTO, and in which it has a military presence. The 
potential armed presence of the IMU in these states might force Russia to en-
gage in armed conflict, which is not desirable for Moscow120. 
The policy of Iran towards the IMU’s combat in Afghanistan, while marginal, 
is of relevance. In 2001, Iran granted temporary asylum to IMU members121, 
116 http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/us-military-aid-central-asia-1999-2009 -
security-priorities-trump-human-rights-and-diplomacy 
117 The East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the Turkestan Islamic Party – an Islamic terrorist 
organisation established in 1997, with predominantly Uighur membership. Its goal is the 
creation of an Islamic state on Uighur territories in China. Currently based in Waziristan, it 
has close ties to the IMU and IJU, and participates both in combat in Afghanistan (on a lim-
ited scale) as well as terrorist activity in China. 
118 Obrashchenya 1 and http://www.cfr.org/china/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim/p9179
119 http://www.ojkum.ru/arc/lib/2010_04_15.pdf
120 This was shown by the ethnic conflict in south Kyrgyzstan in 2010, when the Kyrgyz gov-
ernment asked for Russian troops to intervene under the auspices of the CSTO, yet the 
Russian government chose not to risk engaging its own forces in the pacification process. 
http://lenta.ru/news/2010/06/12/refuse/ 
121 http://www.fergananews.com/article.php?id=4348 
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and there is evidence that Iran currently supports (on a limited scale) the 
movement’s militant activities in Afghanistan122. However, this is only one ele-
ment of a larger change in Iranian strategy towards the Taliban and their al-
lies, whom Iran previously combated but now partially supports, in order to 
harm US attempts to realise its strategy in Afghanistan123. 
3. central asia and russia
The IMU and IJU’s operations in Central Asia, and also in Russia, are mainly 
aimed at the radicalisation and recruitment of new members. Despite numer-
ous media reports and declarations by the states of the region, these organi-
sations are not directly engaged in militancy in these countries. A disturbing 
exception was the IJU’s attempts to engage in terrorism in Kazakhstan after 
2011, setting up means which would have enabled the IJU to channel it and take 
control over the local atomised Islamic radicals. 
At present, Central Asia is above all a source of new recruits for the IMU and 
IJU. The growing Islamisation of the societies of Central Asia favours such ac-
tions, although the authoritarian or even totalitarian character of the region’s 
regimes and their continuous persecution of Islam pose serious problems for 
these organisations. The IMU and IJU have a network of cells in the Central 
Asian countries, whose actions are directed at the radicalisation of Muslims 
and their subsequent recruitment124. Most such operations are conducted in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (where the weakness of state structures combines 
with the rising number of people practising Islam), and the least in Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan, where the level of surveillance over society and the locked-
in character of these states substantially limits (but does not eliminate125) the 
IMU’s and IJU’s capabilities. 
Russia is also an area of operations for the IMU and IJU. This is connected with 
the presence of several million Central Asian labour migrants in Russia (pre-
dominantly from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and to a lesser extent from Kyr-
122 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/09/senior_islamic_movem_2.php
123 Based on the US Department of State report on states supporting terrorism, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170260.htm 
124 The existence of such cells is admitted by the radicals themselves (based on Fidali Ali), but 
also proven by the arrests of its members of such cells by the authorities (for example in Ta-
jikistan in January of 2013 - http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-imu/24825405.html).
125 The IMU and IJU still have volunteers from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Based on Qaboil-
da nima gap 3. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
35
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
11
/2
01
3
gyzstan), amongst whom these organisations actively conduct recruitment 
operations126. This in turn is facilitated by the Islamisation of the emigrants in 
Russia, which is a result of their social situation, attacks from Russian nation-
alist circles and the influence of Islamists from the Muslim republics of the 
Northern Caucasus. The IMU and IJU also conduct recruitment operations on 
a limited scale amongst Russian Islamic radicals (mainly Tatars, but also rep-
resentatives of other ethnic groups (such as Bashkirs), and even ethnic Russian 
converts to Islam)127, which is supported by a wider process of the radicalisa-
tion of Russia’s Muslims128. It is also possible that the IMU and IJU are conduct-
ing recruitment operations amongst the Crimean Tatars (especially bearing 
their rising Islamisation and relations with Central Asia in mind), although 
currently there is no evidence to prove this. 
The radicalisation and recruitment process is lengthy and consists of several 
stages. The first stage is the radicalisation of the future recruit, without the 
recruiter revealing any association with a terrorist organisation129. The second 
stage consists of convincing such an individual of the necessity of migrating 
(hijra) to a territory where sharia is the basic law, and the need to wage jihad; 
only afterwards is the association with the particular organisation revealed130. 
The last stage is the operation to deploy the volunteer together with his fam-
ily (as well as their financial savings) to Waziristan, where before becoming 
a full-fledged member of the organisation, he is subject to a counterintelligence 
screening131 and undergoes thorough training. The journey to Pakistan itself is 
also divided into several stages, and is usually done via Turkey and Iran (also 
rarely through the Persian Gulf countries), but never directly132.
A new and dangerous quality are the attempts made by terrorist organisations 
to exploit the tensions and disturbances caused by the endogenic grassroots 
Islamic radicals. One example of this is the actions of the Islamic Jihad Union 
(and indirectly also al-Qaida) during the terrorist incidents in Kazakhstan af-
126 Based on http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=17739, and an account given by 
a member of the IMU recruited in Russia, published by the IMU (in Fidali Ali).
127 http://www.fergananews.com/news/20667
128 http://www.golos-ameriki.ru/content/russia-siberia-islam/1611001.html 
129 Based on IMU member’s description of his own recruitment. Fidali Ali. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Accounts from the former members of the organisation. Sandree, op. cit. 
132 Based on the account of a journey to Waziristan by volunteers from Kazakhstan, described 
by the wife of a former IJU member in the 2013 documentary films on the Chabar television, 
Zapadnya and Terrorizm v Kazakhstanye – slepaya vera. 
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ter 2011, which were conducted by domestic Islamic radicals. At the same time, 
the lack of engagement by the IMU and IJU in the bloody ethnic conflict be-
tween Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010, shows the limita-
tions of these organisations in exploiting the ethnic conflicts present in the 
region for their own benefit. 
At that time in Kazakhstan, which up to then had been the only state in Cen-
tral Asia free of occurrences of Islamic terrorism, several violent and terror-
ist incidents took place (shooting attacks, bombings and suicide attacks, skir-
mishes with the law enforcement forces), as a result of which 32 people were 
killed133. These attacks were concentrated in the western part of the country 
(but also took place on the outskirts of Almaty) and were directed against the 
law enforcement forces (mainly the National Security Committee (KNB) and 
police)134. One of their causes was the authorities’ brutal putdown of the grow-
ing Islamisation and radicalisation of this part of the country135. Kazakhstan’s 
local Salafists (the majority of whom are against waging jihad in Kazakhstan136) 
are primarily connected with Salafists in Russia and Caucasus, which is also 
true of the Kazakh Islamic radicals, who are atomised and lack organisational 
structures137. 
International terrorist organisations saw the potential of the Kazakh Islamic 
radicals, who had hitherto only sporadically been recruited for militancy in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. At the time the Islamic Jihad Union established 
a new organisation, Jund ul-Khalifah (Soldiers of the Caliphate)138, which was 
headed by Abu Moez (Moezeddine Garsallaoui), a Swiss citizen of Switzerland 
133 Based on information about the casualties of particular attacks, available at: http://tengrinews.
kz/tag/%D0%A2%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BC
134 Ibid.
135 http://rus.azattyq.org/content/terakt_fokina_babitski_taraz_kizatova_demos_kazak-
stan_aktobe/24406772.html as well as based on the notorious tales of persecution of the 
Salafists by the police and KNB found in the posts of Kazakh Salafists on the internet fo-
rums of Islamists in the Caucasus. 
136 For example, the Kazakh religious leader Rinat Abu Muhammad, who is very popular 
amongst the post-Soviet Salafists opposed to armed struggle. More at http://salaf.kz/?p=870 
137 For example, the extensive presence of Kazakh Salafists on the internet forums for the 
Islamic radicals in the Caucasus. Also it was Hunafa, an Islamist website from Caucasus, 
which published a fatwa by Sheikh Abu Munzir Ash-Shinkriti, which allows Muslims in 
Kazakhstan to engage in militancy in defence of the religion. http://hunafa.com/2010/09/
fatva-o-dzhixade-protiv-kazaxstanskoj-policii/ and http://hunafa.com/2011/03/vopros-o-
zakonnosti-voennyx-dejstvij-v-kazaxstane/
138 Based on http://www.sehadetzamani.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=2498 
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of Tunisian descent who had previously been associated with al-Qaida139. The 
goal of Jund ul-Khalifah was to radicalise the Salafist community in Kazakh-
stan, channel the violence and benefit from it. The organisation itself has no 
independence, and is only a cell within the IJU. The main signs of Jund ul-Khal-
ifah’s activity were its statements and threats to the authorities and President 
Nazarbayev140, while its influence on the events in Kazakhstan was small (it re-
cruited the perpetrators of one attack online)141. Despite that, the newly formed 
organisation conducted a broad propaganda campaign and established itself in 
the narrative about Islamic terrorism in the region142. 
The Kazakh government was able to temporarily manage the situation through 
a campaign of mass arrests (over 500 people were arrested)143 and in 2012 Islam-
ic radicals only undertook a few operations144, although there were two unex-
plained incidents145, responsibility for one of which the authorities attributed 
to an undefined Islamic radical group146. The situation showed the authorities’ 
weakness towards Islamic terrorism147, the willingness of the elites to exploit 
this matter in their internal struggles148, international terrorist organisations’ 
interest in Kazakhstan, as well as their readiness to exploit the endogenic 
problems in Central Asia for their benefit. Above all, not only did the causes of 
the occurrence of terrorism in Kazakhstan (the radicalisation of certain cir-
cles and milieus, the pressure of the authorities on the Salafists) not cease, but 
they actually increased in strength, which poses a threat to the stability of the 
country, especially in the context of the unresolved issue of the succession of 
power after President Nazarbayev. 
139 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/jund_al_khilafah_emi.php 
140 http://ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=36876 
141 http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2011/11/01/15322.shtml
142 For example: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=-
40911&tx _ttnews %5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b6a10c91e3e0a1f008278abc9a6097d8
143 http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/v-kazahstane-sotni-chelovek-sidyat-za-ekstre-
mizm -i-terrorizm-229238/
144 http://www.inform.kz/rus/article/2496476 and http://lenta.ru/news/2012/07/12/terrorism/
145 Killing of 14 soldiers and destruction of an outpost on the border with China (http://www.
rferl.org/content/more-kazakh-border-guards-found-dead/24600606.html), and killing 
of 11 people in the mountains of the Ili-Alatau national park (http://www.newsru.com/
crime/14aug2012/8bodynazparkkaz.html). 
146 http://news.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=373083 
147 Principally the appropriate authorities’ lack of readiness to face threats and challenges of 
this kind. 
148 Mainly as an element of a campaign against the powerful head of the National Security 
Comittee Nurtay Abikayev; http://www.astanadaily.kz/?p=1506
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4. europe and global activities
Radical Islamic militants from Central Asia are active in Europe (mainly in 
Germany), where they concentrate on radicalisation and recruitment, but have 
also attempted to perpetrate terrorist attacks. The IMU and IJU’s operations 
in Europe are conducted in cooperation with al-Qaida, which does not possess 
the manpower of these organisations. Apart from this, the IMU and IJU have 
shown interest in engaging in a limited way in activities in other parts of the 
world, such as the South-East Asia or even United States. 
The basic aim of IMU’s and IJU’s operations in Europe is to radicalise the lo-
cal Muslims and recruit volunteers. The pioneer of these actions was the IJU, 
which initiated efforts to recruit new members from Turkey, and gradually 
shifted its activities to Muslim communities in the countries of Western Eu-
rope149. At first this process was part of the subcontracting services for al-
Qaida, but later became an integral part of the IMU and IJU’s operations, an 
element of building up their position amongst other terrorist organisations 
and increasing their attractiveness in the other theatres of operations (such as 
Central Asia and Russia). 
The recruitment of radicals from Europe is conducted by IMU and IJU for sev-
eral purposes: first of all, to gain new militants for the armed struggle in Pa-
kistan and Afghanistan (in these cases, the volunteers are transferred to Wa-
ziristan and undergo training); secondly to create local cells of these organisa-
tions, with the task of supporting the IMU and IJU’s actions in acquiring funds 
or further recruitment; and occasionally to aid in the preparations of terrorist 
acts150. 
The country most vulnerable to the activity of the IMU and IJU is Germany, 
from where about 200 militants of these organisations originate151, and where 
they have attempted to perpetrate several terrorist attacks. The IMU and IJU 
are also active in other European countries, mainly France, the United King-
dom and Denmark, but also in Spain and potentially in Sweden152. In all of these 
149 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39332 
150 Witter, op. cit. 
151 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/disillusioned-german-islamists-returning-
home-to-germany-a-844799.html
152 Based on information about IMU and IJU members detained in Europe; their citizenship, 
residence, place of employment, etc. 
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countries the basis for their activity is the existence of radicalised Muslim 
communities (such as the Salafists)153. With the spread of radical European Is-
lam to other countries of the continent, the area of the IMU’s and IJU’s opera-
tions will probably also increase. 
In Europe, except for auxiliary activity (such as recruitment or acquisition of 
funds, etc.), strictly terrorist actions conducted by radical Islamic militants 
from Central Asia have also taken place. The IMU and IJU have planned several 
attacks in Europe, which were thwarted due to the early discovery of prepa-
rations. However, another serious threat is posed by attacks perpetrated by 
European Islamic radicals who act independently, but who were trained by the 
Central Asian terrorists, or even just inspired by their actions. 
The first attack planned by radical Islamic militants from Central Asia was 
a 2007 attack on the Ramstein American base in Germany with firearms and 
explosive materials154. The perpetrators of the attack were to be members of 
a four-person IJU cell in Sauerland consisting of one Turkish citizen and three 
Germans155, who had received training in Waziristan. They were caught before 
committing the attack, albeit after they had succeeded in planning and car-
rying out most of the preparations (for example, initiating the production of 
explosive materials)156.
In 2010 several intelligence agencies announced that they had discovered 
a plan to conduct a number of attacks in Germany, France and the United King-
dom, which were supposed to be suicide raids resembling the Lashkar-e Taiba 
attack in Mumbai in 2008157. These attacks were ordered directly by Osama bin 
Laden, and the perpetrators were to have been IMU terrorists158. In this case, 
it was possible to discover the plans of terrorists early enough and foil the at-
tacks (the militants who were to have directly participated in the attacks were 
killed while training in the IMU training camp in Waziristan)159. 
153 http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2012/02/03/feature-01
154 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/04/islamic-jihad-union-bomb-plot
155 These included two ethnic Germans, converts to Islam. 
156 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/22/german-terrorism-trial 
157 http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/operation-alberich-how-the-cia-helped-
germany-foil-terror-plot-a-504837.html
158 http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,730377,00.html
159 Including citizens of Germany and the United Kingdom: http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2010/10/british_german_jihad.php
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More dangerous are the less spectacular terrorist attacks conducted not by 
the IMU or IJU cells, but by Islamic radicals who either received training from 
these organisations, or for whom their actions serve as inspiration. Examples 
of this type of actions are the attacks in Toulouse in 2012 (7 fatalities) perpe-
trated by Mohammad Merah, who had undergone training at the IJU training 
camp in Waziristan160; and the 2011 attack on American soldiers in the Frank-
furt airport (2 fatalities), perpetrated by an Albanian Islamic radical, probably 
inspired by the operations (such as the plans to attack the Rammstein airbase) 
of the radical Islamic militants from Central Asia161. Attacks of this type are 
more dangerous, since they are much harder to detect; the perpetrators origi-
nate from Europe (or are citizens of European counties), do not maintain fre-
quent contacts with the terrorist organisations, and their plans of attacks are 
not the subject of communications, the interception of which was the main 
reason for the failure of the complicated, spectacular actions planned by the 
IMU and IJU. The role of these organisations in such attacks is limited to propa-
ganda activity, and possibly training, although this does not minimise the dan-
gers stemming from their operations. 
The IMU and IJU is also employing a similar model of activity on a global scale, 
undertaking a number of actions aimed at the radicalisation of Muslim com-
munities, the acquisition of volunteers and funds, as well as potentially influ-
encing lone Islamic radicals to conduct attacks on their own. This is especially 
true of countries of South-East Asia, where a large social potential exists, and 
where the IMU’s and IJU’s activity is directed mainly at the recruitment and 
acquisition of funds162. These organisation, however, are also active in such ex-
otic (from their point of view) countries as the USA, and even African states, ac-
160 http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/03/french_fighters_train-
ing_in_no.php as well as a statement by Jund ul-Khalifat (a group subordinate to the IJU) 
regarding the training of Merah: http://ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=39797
161 http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/fatal-shooting-at-frankfurt-airport-ger-
man-investigators-suspect-islamist-motives-behind-attack-a-748769.html
162 Mainly Indonesia, Malaysia (because of its language’s proximity to Indonesian), Burma and 
Bangladesh. Based on the analysis of propaganda materials published by IMU and IJU and 
translated to Indonesian and Burmese (for example https://www.ansar1.info/showthread.
php?t=40924, and https://194.145.209.131/~jhufnet/showthread.php?15923-Jundullah-Stu-
dio-presents-New-video-release-by-burmese-language-quot-Izzatu-rasta-quot-Part-3), as 
well as the actions of Mullah Azzam abu Dhar, a Burmese refugee who graduated from a Pa-
kistani madrassa (Vesti iz Pakistana 2), and is currently a prominent member of the IMU: 
http://www.jhuf.net/showthread.php?16775-IMU-Jundullah-Studio-presents-A-Lost-Peo-
ple-(about-the-Tragedies-of-Burma)-Al-Mufti-Abu-Dharr-Azzaam-(Hafidhahullaah)
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cording to some sources163. The main reason for the IMU’s interest in the United 
States is the presence there of a large Uzbek diaspora (about 50,000 people164). 
Examples of IMU’s activity in USA are the 2012 arrest of an Uzbek man who 
had been supporting the movement financially165 and logistically, based on an 
order from the IMU to attack President Obama, as well as the arrest of an IMU 
member (also an Uzbek) in Idaho in May 2013, who had planned to conduct ter-
rorist attacks on US soil166. The IJU is also active on the territory of the United 
States, evidence of which is the arrests of IJU members (recruited online) in 
Chicago and Philadelphia in 2012167. 
163 http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/637260-police-issue-fresh-terror-alert.html
164 http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2012/01/27/938338.html
165 http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan_united_states_obama_islamic_move-
ment/24480474.html 
166 http://www.idahostatesman.com/2013/05/18/2581161/boise-case-may-be-new-chapter.html 
167 http://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/US-man-arrested-for-supporting-Uzbek-Islamic-
militants 
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v. perspectives
The activity of radical Islamic militants from Central Asia is subject to rapid 
and dynamic changes. This trend will probably continue in the future, which 
makes it difficult to forecast their further operations. The possible scenarios 
include the establishment of a quasi-state in northern Afghanistan, or a pos-
sible return of the IMU and IJU to Central Asia. Much will depend on the state 
of affairs at the time, such as the situation in Afghanistan after the planned 
withdrawal of the ISAF forces in 2014, as well as the internal stability of the 
Central Asian states and the rise of already existing tensions. 
The future of the IMU and IJU will largely be a function of the situation inside 
Afghanistan after 2014. The American strategy of increasing the size of its mil-
itary contingent and intensifying the operations (the so-called surge), which 
was effective in Iraq, failed to accomplish its goals in Afghanistan. The Taliban 
were forced out of some of the areas they controlled in the south168 (such as 
Helmand), although this was a short-lived success; after shifting the gravity of 
conflict to other regions, they return to the areas they previously controlled. 
The international community has not succeeded in creating efficient state ap-
paratus and state institutions in Afghanistan, and the political system does 
not reflect the real balance of power between the particular groups. Simul-
taneously, the power of the northern warlords, who were traditionally hos-
tile towards to Taliban, has been substantially weakened169. This has created 
a situation where the authorities in Kabul are weak and ineffective170, while the 
ethnic minorities in the north lack leadership, are detached from each other 
and internally divided. At the same time the Taliban, and the forces allied with 
them, are actually in control of the situation in many provinces, conduct the 
functions of local administration, and due to the absence of any real political 
representation for the Pashtuns, enjoy growing support from that part of the 
population. In the perspective of the 2014 withdrawal of the ISAF and major-
ity of the American forces, a return to the status quo ante 2001 is possible. Such 
168 Initially the surge was supposed to also include the east of the country, although due to great-
er than expected difficulties in the south of the country, the plan was not fully realised. 
169 Limiting their role after 2001 by the authorities in Kabul and the policies of the United 
States. The Taliban have also assassinated several influential former warlords and political 
figures from the north of the country (such as Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former president 
and leader of the Tajiks), with the intention of hindering the unification of the north in the 
perspective of 2014. 
170 A substantial problem, for example, is the overwhelming corruption present at all levels of 
power. 
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a scenario would mean the collapse of the central government, civil war be-
tween the Taliban (supported by Pakistan) and forces representing the ethnic 
minorities from the north (supported by Russia, USA and the Central Asian 
states); as well as the far-reaching fragmentation of the country. 
For the IMU and IJU, such a situation would open up new opportunities, and 
their operations in northern Afghanistan would significantly increase. They 
will probably never reach a level which would allow the IMU to take control 
over the entire north of the country, yet establishing control over part of the 
territories in the north does not seem improbable. Depending on the course of 
events, the radical militants from Central Asia would be able to either continue 
their militancy alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan while maintaining their 
headquarters in Pakistan, or transfer all their assets to Afghanistan and control 
a chosen compact area, which would de facto became a quasi-state (similar to the 
fragmentation of the country in the 1990s), closely linked to the Taliban and al-
Qaida. This would substantially strengthen the Central Asian Islamic radicals 
concentrated around the IMU and IJU, while the existence itself of such an entity 
would pose many threats to the region by reinforcing the fears of the Central 
Asian states and China, as well as by increasing the existing internal tensions. 
The potential return of the IMU and IJU to active militant operations in Cen-
tral Asia depends not only on the situation in Afghanistan and the role these 
organisations will play in it, but also the internal situation in Central Asia it-
self. Regardless of the course of events, a return of the IMU and IJU to the re-
gion as a compact force seems highly improbable, and a more likely scenario 
is that these organisations will exploit the possible escalation of tensions and 
conflicts in the region. 
Regardless of the particular states’ current political and economic successes 
(primarily Kazakhstan), or the effectiveness of their apparatus of repression 
(primarily Uzbekistan), both they and the region of Central Asia as a whole are 
highly unstable in their political and social structures, as well as their stabili-
sation mechanisms being not fully-fledged and vulnerable to shocks. Kazakh-
stan not only has the problem of the radicalisation of some circles and groups 
(such as the Salafists in the west of the country), but above all communal ten-
sions with a social background (which could be seen for example in the fre-
quent worker strikes) and the unresolved issue of the succession of power after 
President Nazarbayev. If these factors superimpose on each other, they could 
pose a serious threat to the stability of the country, and due to its importance 
in the region, also to the neighbouring states. Uzbekistan has a similar serious 
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problem regarding the succession of power after President Karimov (who has 
ruled the country since 1989), and the expected subsequent struggle within the 
elite, which could cause the exposure of suppressed social tensions, or even 
a violent domestic conflict. Kyrgyzstan, apart from the general weakness of 
the state, suffers from a deep socio-political divide between the north and the 
south of the country, which has previously been a source of instability. The 
ethnic conflict in the south of the country is still unresolved, and even a minor 
incident could transform into open armed clashes on an even larger scale than 
took place in 2010. The Islamic factor in the south of the country is also ris-
ing; the Islamists171 have detached themselves from the ethnic divides172, and 
are a distinct force whose importance is on the rise173. The role of Islam is also 
growing in Tajikistan, where the state authorities are fighting against both the 
Islamisation of the country, the legal Islamic party, as well as both real and 
perceived radicals; this leads to these groups’ growing frustration which, in 
combination with the other tensions (such as those existing between different 
regions), the bad socio-economic situation and the erosion of state authority, 
could be a serious threat to the stability of the country. Apart from these fac-
tors, there are also tensions and animosities between the states of the region, 
as seen in the border incidents in the Fergana Valley (between Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) and tensions between Tashkent and Dushanbe. 
There also is a possibility of a merger of internal crises in particular countries, 
for example if Uzbekistan intervenes (as part of the consolidation of the new 
power after Karimov’s death) in the ethnic conflict in southern Kyrgyzstan. 
For the IMU and IJU, the above threats to the region’s stability offer potential 
room for re-establishing their presence in the region. The IMU’s entry into 
Central Asia as an organised and compact force is highly unlikely; a more prob-
able scenario seems to be the IMU and IJU becoming involved in a future crisis 
in one or other of the Central Asian states and subsequent exploitation of the 
Islamic factor. The most probable areas of such activity seem to be Uzbekistan 
(if the power struggle leads to an internal conflict) and Kyrgyzstan (if, as a re-
sult of the ethnic conflict in the south, chaos breaks out, and the role of local 
171 In this case these are not necessarily individuals adhering to the radical branches of Islam, 
but rather people who practice their faith and adhere to the religious commandments. 
172 They took an active role in preventing and combating violence during the ethnic conflict in 
2010. 
173 Signs of their willingness to take action and further radicalise are apparent, as seen in ac-
counts of Islamists from southern Kyrgyzstan fighting in Syria; http://www.fergananews.
com/news/20677
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Islamists rises). In a practical dimension, these operations would consist of or-
ganising and training local Islamists, providing weapons, and the direct par-
ticipation of only a limited number of IMU and IJU militants, who would serve 
as commanders and experts174. The goal of such actions would first of all be the 
seizure of power, if not in the whole country, than in part of it (for example, the 
Fergana Valley). 
The appearance of radical Islamic militants, even in a limited scope and in one 
country of the region, would have far-reaching political consequences for all 
the Central Asian states and neighbouring powers. The regimes of these states 
fear that the IMU might return to the region and join in the existing tensions. 
A situation where radical Islamic militants are involved in armed clashes in 
one of the Central Asian states would cause panic reactions from the other 
countries of the region, which could include the closing of the borders, limited 
intervention (for example by Kazakhstan in northern Kyrgyzstan, or by Uz-
bekistan in Kyrgyzstan) and requests for foreign intervention (first of all by 
Russia). 
If such a situation occurs, Russia’s (and potentially also China’s) willingness 
to provide direct military assistance under the auspices of the SCTO or SCO 
remains an open issue. In the case of an actual conflict in Central Asia with 
the participation of the IMU and IJU, Russia would be interested in eliminating 
these organisations’ destructive influence to its territory (for example through 
limiting its spread to the other countries of the region), than in direct armed 
combat with the Islamic radicals. However, that does not mean that Russia 
would not take advantage of the threat of the militants’ return to realize its 
goals in the region (for example the issue of the return of Russian troops to the 
Tajik-Afghan border), or in the case of a crisis in one of the states, to secure its 
interests in the others (for example by establishing a military presence in Uz-
bekistan or Kazakhstan). In the face of a threat of further expansion of Islamic 
radicalism, such a move could be accepted by the local regimes. 
In the case of IMU and IJU actions conducted on a global scale (such as those 
in Europe), we could expect both their intensification and further geographi-
cal expansion (for example to the Philippines, the Muslim communities in 
Australia or the countries of Latin America). The current operations of these 
organisations show that the main threat does not come from their direct par-
174 As has already taken place in northern Afghanistan. 
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ticipation in terrorist attacks outside of their traditional region of interest, but 
from an indirect yet no less dangerous threat, through the radicalisation of 
local Muslim communities (through the influence of IMU and IJU propaganda) 
or by the inspiration and training of Islamic radicals, independent and isolated 
in their actions. Another challenge for Europe could be the return of the IMU 
and IJU militants to their home countries, where with their combat experience 
and radical Islamic views, they could pose a serious threat to public security.
Józef lanG
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map 3. Main area of activity of radical Islamic militants of Central Asia in 2013
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Radical Islamic militants from Central Asia have ceased to be a local 
phenomenon. The organisations created by those groups (the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union) engage in 
propaganda, recruitment, fundraising and terrorist operations in states 
distant from their traditional area of interest, such as European Union 
countries, South Asia and the United States. Their ranks contain not only 
Central Asian Islamists, but also those from other countries, such as 
Russia, Pakistan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, Turkey 
and even Myanmar. These organisations’ current activities and forms are 
multidimensional and complicated, characterised by combat versatility, 
structural amorphism, operational mobility and simultaneous operations 
in different fields and theatres. As a result of the universalisation 
of Islamic terrorism, these organisations have been intensifying 
contacts with other international Islamic terrorist organisations based 
in Waziristan (mainly al-Qaida, Taliban and the Haqqani Network). 
A specific system of mutual cooperation has developed between 
them, involving the specialisation of various terrorist organisations in 
particular aspects of terrorist activity. The IMU and IJU specialise in the 
recruitment and training of Islamic radicals from around the world, and 
have thus become a kind of ‘jihad academy’.
